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Felon Disenfranchisement: A Literature Review 
 
 
 In this paper we examine the literature on felon disenfranchisement laws. We summarize 
studies of the history, statistical determinants, and constitutional status of these laws. We look at 
the impacts of these laws on voter turnout, partisan politics and public policy formation. In the 
process of our analysis, we tease out the pros and cons over these laws. We see the debate over 
felon disenfranchisement as part of the larger debate over the issues of voter suppression and the 
future of democracy in the United States.  
 On one side of the debate are scholars who see these laws as normal and unproblematic. 
Within their perspective, these laws are race neutral and have historical roots extending back to 
ancient and medieval times.  Some of these scholars claim that these laws are consistent with 
enlightenment democratic theory, well grounded in English Common Law, and solidly supported 
by the United States Constitution. They insist that the authors of the 14th amendment supported 
and promoted these laws precisely because they are applied equally to all citizens and maintain 
the purity and integrity of the voting process. They argue that if these laws have a 
disproportionate impact on racial groups in the United States, this impact is unintentional and 
can best be explained by members of these groups having higher incidents of committing 
felonies. In a Wall Street Journal editorial written in response to Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
criticism of these laws, Jason Riley summaries this defensive perspective: 
  
Blacks are disproportionately affected by felon disenfranchisement laws because a 
disproportionate number of blacks are felons. The problem is black criminality, not racist 
laws. White felons face the same voting restrictions, which date not to America’s post-
Civil War period, as Mr. Holder suggested in his remarks, but to medieval Europe by way 
of ancient Greece and Rome. Indeed, many of the voter-disenfranchisement laws in this 
country were passed long before blacks could even vote. “From 1776 to 1821, eleven 
states adopted constitutions that disenfranchised felons or permitted their statutory 
disenfranchisements,” explained George Brooks in a Fordham Urban Law Journal article. 
“That African-Americans are disproportionately disenfranchised is a matter of grave 
concern, but it is a side effect of high crime rates. It flows from their status as felons, not 
from their race (Riley 2014).” 
 
   
 On the other side of the debate, a number of scholars offer an alternative and more 
critical perspective. They see these laws as not only problematic, but undergirded by profound 
and persisting racial biases. They argue that these biases are evident in historical, statistical, and 
constitutional analyses. They demonstrate that these laws became more restrictive during periods 
of increasing racial repression, became more expansive and punitive during the post-
Reconstruction era, and were part of systematic and deliberate efforts to disenfranchise African 
Americans. They show that these laws are statistically associated with racial fears. Critical 
constitutional scholars claim that the authors of the 14th and 15th amendments would be appalled 
by these laws. These scholars conclude that the United States is unique among developed 
democratic nations in the world: “Nowhere else are millions of offenders who are not in prison 
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denied the right to vote (Manza and Uggen 2006, 41).” Moreover, the United States incarcerates 
and disenfranchises a much larger proportion of its racial minority population than any other 
nation in the world.    
 In this paper, we weigh in on this debate. We believe that the preponderance of the 
evidence supports the view that felon disenfranchisement laws are racially biased and 
inconsistent with liberal democratic theory. We examine the felon disenfranchisement literature 
from these perspectives: historical, statistical, constitutional, and political.   
 
Historical   
 
 Felon disenfranchisement laws have a long history. This history can be divided into five 
major eras: Pre-Revolutionary age (ancient times, up to the American Revolution), 
Revolutionary and Jacksonian period (1776-1865), Post-Civil War phase (1865-1965), Civil 




 The pre-Revolutionary periods includes ancient, medieval and colonial times. Most 
historical studies trace the origin of felon disenfranchisement laws back to Greek and Roman 
times, although democracy was rare in the ancient world and restricted wherever it existed, as 
slaves, women, and non-citizens were excluded from the polis in these societies. Democracy was 
considered a bad form of government.  Ancient philosophers saw democracy as mob rule. Plato 
insisted that democratic societies deteriorated into anarchy which gives rise to tyranny. Aristotle 
saw democracy as a rule by people of low birth, no property and vulgar employment. Although 
ancient Athens was considered a democracy, slaves and property-less citizens were excluded 
from the polis, and free speech was not tolerated, as the execution of Socrates demonstrated. In 
Greek society, atimia was imposed on criminal offenders. That is, citizens lost all citizenship 
rights, including the right to vote. Roman society imposed infamia, which involved a range of 
penalties (loss of reputation, loss of the privilege of serving in the Roman Legion, or loss of the 
right to participate in the polis, including the right to vote). The penalty depended on the 
seriousness of the crime and the social class of the offender (Manza and Uggen 2004, 23).  
  Medieval society involved a legal measure much more extreme than just felon 
disenfranchisement, the legal doctrine of “civil death.” Civil death entailed the loss of all 
citizenship rights: the right to participate in civil society, to sit on juries, to sue others, to testify 
in court, to enter into contracts, to purchase property, or to speak in public. Civil death required 
the forfeiture of property as well as the loss of the right to vote. The problem with felon 
disenfranchisement in both ancient and medieval societies is that these societies were never 
known for promoting democracy. Greek societies were ruled by tyrants or kings, Roman society 
by Caesars, and medieval societies by monarchs and aristocrats. Where democracy existed in the 
ancient world, it was for the privileged few. Undesirable people of low birth, no property, vulgar 
employment, bad reputation or infamous character were excluded from the polis.  
 
English Common Law and Colonies 
 
The ancient and medieval customs of limiting membership in the polis to privileged 
males continued under English common law. Neither English nor Colonial law recognized 
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voting as a right of citizenship. The right to vote was limited to property owning males.  The 
Colonies had felon disenfranchisement laws.  However, these laws were vague, often moral and 
narrowly defined. For example, Maryland disenfranchised anyone guilty of public drunkenness. 
Massachusetts disenfranchised people guilty of “shameful and vitious crimes” (Manza and 
Uggen 2004, 24).  
 
Revolution and Jacksonian Era 
 
 Most Americans see the American Revolution as an exceptional historical moment that 
advanced humanity toward liberty, equality and democracy. Conventional wisdom insists that 
democracy was not born fully developed in the United States. Rather, initially, the right to vote 
was restricted to the property owning class. However, conventional wisdom maintains that the 
whole history of the vote and democracy in the United States is a history of linear progress, of 
increasing democracy, of gradual expansion of the right to vote to previously excluded groups: 
first to property-less white males, then to black males and finally to women.  
The extension of the right to vote to property-less white males was a long and gradual 
process. State governments began to remove these restrictions in the early 19th century. This 
process accelerated during the Jacksonian era. The Jacksonian era, from the 1820s to the 1860s, 
is known for the expansion of democracy and equality and for the eclipse of the practice of 
showing deference to the rich, the educated, and the privileged disappeared. Moreover, state 
governments eliminated property owning and tax-paying requirements for voting. The right to 
vote expanded to white males. 
Felon disenfranchisement is part of the story of the expansion of the right to vote. These 
laws increased as the right to vote expanded. As noted above, between 1776 and 1821, eleven 
states adopted constitutions that disenfranchised felons or allowed state legislatures to pass laws 
disenfranchising felons. Because felon disenfranchisement laws expanded during the same 
period in which the right to vote was extended to white males, defenders of these laws see them 
as associated with democracy and unrelated to racial prejudices. Jason Riley adds, “Indeed, many 
of the voter-disenfranchisement laws in this country were passed long before blacks could even 
vote (Riley 2014).”  
 An alternative, less popular, but more critical view suggests that there were competing 
political factions inside the American Revolution. According to this view, while there were many 
leaders that promoted the ideas of liberty, equality and democracy, the dominant leaders were 
major property and slave owners who opposed democracy, who feared the masses, and who saw 
the Revolution as a movement against a colonial master that imposed unfair taxes to pay for 
French and Indian War without representation. Moreover, this property/slave owning class saw 
England as unenthusiastic about slavery and adamantly opposed to their expansion westward into 
Native American territory (Aziz). Whereas some leaders like Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine 
and Ethan Allen favored extending the right to vote to all males, black and white, rich and poor, 
most leaders including James Madison, John Adams, John Jay, and many others insisted on 
limiting the right to vote to property owners (Keyssar 2000). Because of the intensity of this 
debate, the authors of the Constitution shifted the responsibility of deciding the qualifications for 
voting to the state legislatures. Most states restricted the right to vote to property owning, tax-
paying males.  
 According to this narrative, the right to vote was not extended to white males because of 
the growth of democratic ideas or mass protest. Rather the privileged property and slave owning 
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classes extended the right to vote to the property-less white males for a number of pragmatic 
reasons.  First, white males were needed to settle new Western territory. New states offered them 
the right to vote to attract them to help populate the area.   
Second, property-less white males were needed in the military to fight wars with other 
countries, to subjugate Native Americans, and to suppress slave revolts. It was easier for the 
privileged class to persuade property-less white males to shed their blood, risk their lives and 
limbs serving in the military by making them part of the polis. Privileged, property owning white 
males extended the right to vote to property-less white males as part of a grand bargain. In 
exchange for the right to vote, the property-less were enlisted to fight wars against Britain 
(1812), Mexico (1848), and Native Americans.  
Most importantly, property-less white males were needed to suppress slave revolts and 
control slave populations. This need explains the contradiction of state legislatures extending the 
right to vote to white males while taking away this right from black males. Slave revolts of the 
1820s and 1830s heighten fears of blacks. These fears were associated with the rise of anti-black 
laws. During the 1830s, 40s and 50s, a number of Southern states passed laws barring free blacks 
from residing inside their boundaries.  A number of Northern states passed laws requiring blacks 
to pay a bounty or fee in order to reside in the state. These bounties ranged from $500 to $1,000. 
Some states like Oregon barred blacks from owning real estate, entering into contracts, or 
testifying in court.  
Felon disenfranchisement laws became more expansive and restrictive as state 
governments became more racially repressive. This repression was most evident between 1830 
and 1865. In the early years of the Republic states, blacks were less repressed and felon 
disenfranchisement laws were less restrictive. From 1776 to 1790, most states allowed free black 
males to vote. “In 1790, only 3 of the 13 states excluded nonwhites from voting…(Manza and 
Uggen 2008, 53).” During this same period, felon disenfranchisement laws were restrictive. As 
noted above, Maryland denied the vote to those guilt of public drunkenness, Massachusetts for 
those guilty of shameful and vitious crimes. In 1819, Alabama denied the vote to “any person 
who may be convicted of bribery, forgery, perjury, or any other high crime or misdemeanor 
Manza and Uggen 2008)” 
These early laws were narrow compared to more modern laws enacted after 1830. 
Disenfranchising people for bribery or perjury convictions is fundamentally different from 
disenfranchising people for theft, breaking and entry, armed robbery, embezzlement, forgery, 
drug possession, assault, murder or other felonies. The former is narrow and impacts a small 
number of cases. The latter is much broader and impacts a much larger population.  
After 1830, states became more racially repressive and felon disenfranchisement laws 
more restrictive. “By 1840, 20 of the then 26 states had removed nonwhites from the rolls, either 
by directly specifying that African Americans could not vote or by indirectly disenfranchising 
them through the implementation of onerous property requirements applicable only to African 
Americans (as in New York) (Manza Uggen 2008, 53).” As states eliminated property owning as 
a condition for white males to vote, states imposed severe restrictions of the voting rights of non-
whites: 
 
Of equal importance, every state that entered the union after 1819 prohibited blacks from 
voting. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, moreover, many states (including New York, 
Ohio, Indiana and Wisconsin) reaffirmed their racial exclusions, either in constitutional 
conventions or through popular referenda. By 1855, only five states (Massachusetts, 
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Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island) did not discriminate against 
African Americans, and these states contained only 4 percent of the nation’s free black 
population. Notably, the federal government also prohibited blacks from voting in the 
territories it controlled; in 1857, the Supreme Court ruled that blacks, free or slave, could 
not be citizens of the United States Keyssar 2000, 55). 
 
As racial prejudices and proslavery sentiments rose, the movement to disenfranchise 
blacks intensified. Anti-black attitudes and support for more expansive and restrictive felon 
disenfranchisement tended to coincided. The racist mind saw blacks as part of the criminal 
element. Manza and Uggen illustrate this point with quotes from New York political leaders 
arguing for laws to bar blacks from voting: 
 
The minds of blacks are not competent to vote. They are too degraded to estimate the 
value, or exercise with fidelity and discretion this important right…Look to your jails and 
penitentiaries. By whom are they filled? By the very race it is now proposed to clothe 
with the power of deciding upon your political rights (Manza and Uggen 2008, 42). 
 
Manza and Uggen identified 14 states that established more modern felon disenfranchisement 
laws, either by expanding existing laws or establishing newer, more onerous laws.  
See Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
States Expanding Felon Disenfranchisement Laws 
State    Year   State      Year 
Virginia  1830   Minnesota   1857 
Ohio   1835   Indiana    1852 
Louisiana    1845   Oregon   1859 
Iowa     1846   Pennsylvania   1860 
New York    1847    Nevada   1864 
Kansas   1859 
Wisconsin   1846 
California    1849 
Kentucky  1851 
 
 
From 1830 to 1865, as white males gained the right to vote, black males lost this right either 
directly through state laws that explicitly barred blacks from voting or state laws that restricted 
the black vote to only a few capable of owning property or paying an extremely high bounty in 
order to vote. At the same time that these states passed these racially restrictive laws, they also 
passed more expansive modern felon disenfranchising laws. Thus, according to this perspective, 
the expansion of felon disenfranchisement laws were part a larger movement to disenfranchise 
black voters.  
 




 During the Reconstruction period (1865-1876) and after the ratification of the 14th and 
15th amendments, the right to vote was extended to black males. Some states repealed their felon 
disenfranchising laws. Blacks voted. Many were elected to state legislatures and to congress. 
Two were elected to the U.S. Senate.  
 After 1876, racial repression reemerged with a vengeance during the Redeemer period. 
The Southern landed aristocracy campaigned violently and relentlessly to disenfranchise blacks 
and to regain their dominant political position in both Southern and national politics (Foner and 
DuBois). By the beginning of the 20th century, most blacks had lost the right to vote, despite the 
15th amendment. Felon disenfranchise laws proliferated during this period. As new states joined 
the union, they too disenfranchised felons. Between 1865 and 1900 “19 states adopted or 
amended laws restricting the voting rights of criminal offenders (Manza and Uggen 2008, 55).”  
Racial bias played a role in the construction of Post-Reconstruction felon 
disenfranchisement laws. When compiling their list of felonies punishable by the loss of the right 
to vote, many state legislators including felonies that they believed were most likely committed 
by blacks and excluded from this list, crimes they believed were most likely committed by 
whites. Typically, states excluded fighting and murder from the list of disenfranchising laws 
because these crimes were more like committed by whites; but included adultery, wife-beating, 
thievery, chicken stealing, house breaking and other crimes deemed more likely committed by 
blacks: 
 
Similarly, South Carolina restricted the right to vote in dealing with crimes that were 
more likely committed by an African American such as “thievery…adultery [and] house 
breaking.” However, crimes more likely to be committed by a white American as 
opposed to an African American like “murder and fighting,” did not result in 
disenfranchisement (Spears 2014, 94).  
 
Alabama law makers added “moral turpitude” and “wife-beating” to their list of 
infractions, but excluded fighting and murder because they believed these crimes were more 
likely committed by whites than by blacks. We know that this was the deliberate intent of this 
law, because the author expressed this intent in clear language: “John Fielding Burns, the 
sponsor of the new disfranchisement bill boasted that “the crime of wife-beating alone would 
disqualify sixty percent of the Negroes (Manza and Uggen 2008, 58).” Moreover, this state 
banned all felons and ex-felons from voting, permanently. A few states included the crime of 
miscegenation on this list.  
It is no coincidence that more expansive and onerous felon disenfranchisement laws were 
enacted around the same time states were enacting poll tax, literacy test, character test, and 
grandfather clause laws. These laws were motivated by a bias against blacks and were designed 
to circumvent the 15th amendment. An 1896 Mississippi Supreme Court decision illustrates this 
point. The court not only expressed the common prejudice of black criminality, it acknowledged 
that Mississippi law makers expanded felon disenfranchisement laws in order to circumvent the 
15th amendment and disenfranchise blacks:  
 
Within the field of permissible action under the limitations imposed by the federal 
constitution, the convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the 
franchise by the negro race. By reason of its previous condition of servitude and 
dependence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit of 
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temperament, and of character, which clearly distinguishes it as a race from that of the 
whites—a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory within narrow 
limits without forethought and its criminal members given rather to furtive offenses than 
to the robust crimes of whites. Restrained by the federal constitution from discriminating 
against the negro race, the convention discriminated against its characteristics and the 
offenses to which its weaken members were prone.  
 
In other words, the court acknowledged that state legislatures passed these laws to disenfranchise 
blacks without running afoul of the 15th amendment. The court also expressed the common 
prejudice that blacks were criminally prone. This prejudice was common among public officials 
of this era:  
 
Racial stereotyping about criminality has been pervasive. Theodore Roosevelt, 
expressing widely held views in the Progressive era, called for “relentless and unceasing 
warfare against law breaking black men” on the ground that “laziness and 
shiftlessness…and above all, vice and criminality of every kind, are evils more potent for 
harm to the black race than all acts of oppression of white men put together (Manza and 
Uggen 2008, 47).  
 
The racial stereotype of black criminality was also prevalent in academic literature. In the early 
20th century, the discipline of criminology associated criminal behavior with subordinate racial 
and ethnic groups: 
 
The ascription of criminal traits to subordinate racial and ethnic groups also defined the 
early history of criminology. For example, Cesare Lombroso and other early 
criminologists made reference to “criminal races (Manza and Uggen 2008, 47).” 
 
Statistical Determinants of History of Felon Disenfranchisement 
 
 This alternative history of felon disenfranchisement proposes a testable hypothesis: The 
hypothesis is that the emergence of felon disenfranchisement has nothing to do with race or 
racial prejudices. To test this and the alternative hypothesis, Manza and Uggens use a complex, 
event history, multivariate, statistical analysis of the determinants of felon disenfranchisement. 
They identify four levels of their dependent variable, felon disenfranchisement: 
 
1) Disenfranchisement only while incarcerated.  
2) Disenfranchisement while incarcerated and while on parole 
3) Disenfranchisement  for the length of the sentence, until completion of probation, 
parole, and incarceration) 
4) Disenfranchisement after completion of sentence (ex-felon). (Manza and Uggen 
2008, 64).  
 
They rely on racial (or ethnic) threat theory in developing their independent variables. This 
theory assumes that felon disenfranchisement laws would expand and become more restrictive as 
perceptions of racial threats increase. Manza and Uggen use three indicators of racial threats: the 
percentage of the population that is non-white, the percentage of the state prison population that 
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is non-white and the percentage of the white male population 15-39 that is idle, unemployed and 
not in school. They include alternative determinants of felon disenfranchisement laws such as 
partisanship, region, time period, and date of statehood.  They used three time periods: prior to 
1870, 1870-1960, and 1960 to the present.  
 The results of their analysis disconfirms the view that felon disenfranchisement laws have 
nothing to do with race. Their data demonstrate that the association between felon 
disenfranchisement laws and their racial threat indicators--percentage of non-white population, 
percentage of non-white prison population, and percentage of white 15 to 39 idle—is strong and 
statistically significant. Although felon disenfranchisement laws were most restrictive in the 
South and West, the effect of region disappeared in their multivariate regression analysis that 
controlled for region. They also found that time period mattered. They conclude: 
 
As expected, racial threat has more pronounced and consistent effects in the post-1870 
period. That the nonwhite prison population remains a strong predictor in the earlier 
period is perhaps not surprising in models predicting felon disenfranchisement, because 
the racial composition of state prisons likely represents the most proximal measure of 
racial threat. Racial challenges to political power were much more visible during and 
after Reconstruction, but it is important to note that they predated 1870 (Manza and 
Uggen 2008, 66-67).  
 
 State legislatures could not disenfranchise blacks explicitly because of race. The 15th 
amendment prohibited overt racial exclusion from the voting booths.  In order to circumvent the 
15th amendment state governments used a number of seemingly race neutral devices, including 
the literacy tests, poll taxes, character tests, and grandfather clause. Felon disenfranchisement 
laws emerged after 1870s and joined this list of race neutral devices bar blacks from the polls.  
 
From Civil Rights to Today 
 
 The Civil Rights Movement along with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 24th 
amendment ended the two most effective race neutral devices for disenfranchising blacks: the 
literacy test and the poll tax. The overwhelming majority of blacks gained the right to vote. Felon 
disenfranchisement had not been a major issue. It became an issue by the 2000 election. Three 
factors made it an issue: the U.S. Civil Rights Commission report on the 2000 election, the 
exponential increase in the incarceration rate, and the recent changes in these laws, making them 
even more punitive and restrictive.  
 
The 2000 Election 
 
 Florida decided the outcome of the 2000 election, or rather the U.S. Supreme Court 
allowed the last vote count to decide the election. Aside from the controversy of this court 
decision, a report by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Irregularities in Florida raised the 
visibility of the felon disenfranchisement controversy.  Whereas this report found several 
irregularities—Florida State Police setting up roadblocks on streets leading to voting places, 
votes lost, ballots spoiled, voting places closing early—felon disenfranchisement laws 
constituted a special and serious problem.  
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These laws were used like the old literacy test, which disenfranchise blacks who could 
read and write. That is, Florida’s laws disenfranchised blacks who had never been arrested, never 
charged with a crime or never had a felony conviction. Florida accomplished this feat through 
the process of scrubbing its voting rolls—eliminating for the list of registered voters people who 
had not voted for several elections, people who were deceased, and people with felony 
convictions. The Florida Secretary of State Office contracted with a private firm. The firm 
developed a list of the names of people with felony convictions in Florida and several other 
states. All of the names on the voter registration list that matched the names on the list of 
convicted felons were purged without verifying whether to registered voter actually had a felony 
conviction. Consequently, thousands of people without a felony conviction were purged from the 
voter registration rolls and denied the right to vote. Legitimately registered voters with no felony 
record who were purged from the rolls were never notified that they were de-registered. Also, a 
large percentage of those purged were black. The report adds, “For instance, in the state’s largest 
county, Miami-Dade, more than 65 percent of the names on the purge list were African 
American, who represented only 20.4 percent of the population (U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
2001).”   
 Felon disenfranchisement laws emerged as a special and serious problem because of the 
sheer number and proportion of people who lost the right to vote. This problem was exacerbated 
by the exponential increase in the number of people with felony convictions, producing an 
incarceration crisis. 
  
Exponential Increase in Prison Populations 
 
 According to data gather by the Sentencing Project, the number of people incarcerate in 
state and federal prisons in United States was around 100,000 in the 1920s. This population 
fluctuated around 200,000 throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. By 1980 this population had 
reached 319, 598 (see table 2). It increased geometrically throughout the next three decades and 
peaked in 2010 at 1,521,414.  
 
Table 2 
Number of Persons under Correctional Supervision 
1980-2011 
Year Probation Jail   Prison  Parole  Total 
1980  1,118,097 183,988    319,598 220,438  1,842,100 
1985 1,968,712 256,615    487,593 300,203  3,013,100 
1990  2,670,234 405,320    743,382 531,407  4,350,300  
1995 3,077,861 507,044  1,078,542 679,421  5,342,900 
2000 3,839,532 621,149  1,316,333 725,527  6,460,000 
2005 4,162,495 747,529  1,447,942 784,354  7,050,900 
2010 4,055.514 748,728  1,521,414 840,676  7,079,500 
2011 3,971,319 735,601  1,504,150 853,852  6,977,700 
 The magnitude of the U.S. incarceration rate becomes more apparent when presented in 
comparative perspective. Table 3 compares the U.S. rate with the rates of select countries based 
on 2013 data.  The U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the world. Its rate per 100,000, 
which accounts for population is over six times the Canadian rate and close to five times the 
British rate and almost double the Russian rate. Whereas U.S. political leaders often condemn 
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Cuba and China for having oppressive regimes, the U.S. rate exceeds the Cuban rate by about 
200 and the Chinese rate by almost 600. It is an understatement to say that the U.S. has an 
incarceration crisis.  
 
Table 3 
Incarceration rates for the U.S. and Select Countries 
Number Incarcerated Per 100,000 
   Incarceration 
Country  Rate 
U.S.   716 
Barbados  521 
Cuba   520 
Russia   475 
Turkey   179 
United Kingdom 148 
China   121 
Canada  118 
Italy   109 
France     98 
Germany    79 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that the U.S. has the most racially repressive criminal justice 
system in the world.  The Sentencing Project reports that the U.S. incarcerates its black 
population at a rate of 4,789 per 100,000.  In 2006, there were 836,000 black males in jail or 
prison out of a total black male population of 18,262,000. That is, about 4.48 percent of the black 
male population has been incarcerated. According to the Sentencing Project on any given day in 
the U.S. about ten percent of black males between the ages of 30 and 39 are in jail or prison.   
Whereas conventional wisdom would have us believe that this astronomically high black 
incarceration rate is a function of astronomically high rates of committing crimes, a host of 
scholars have challenged this perspective, pointing to two factors: the ascension of the most 
draconian criminal justice laws in U.S. history and a racially biased criminal justice system.  
Michelle Alexander, Marc Mauers, the Sentencing Project and others have documented 
the ascension of these draconian laws, which occurred at both the state and federal levels. They 
argue that these laws produced the exponential increase in incarceration rates, independent of 
any changes of crime rates. They note that these laws include mandatory minimum sentences and 
three-strikes you’re out laws.  Whereas these laws were enacted to incapacitate violent career 
criminals, the impact of these laws was to impose excessively high sentences of people for petty 
and non-violent acts.  
The Ewing v California decision illustrates this point. In this decision, Gary Ewing was 
sentenced to life for stealing three golf clubs.  Of course, this was his fourth felony conviction.  
In The Celling of America: An Inside Look at the U.S. Prison Industry, Willie Wisely 
provide many more examples. Joel Murillo, sentenced to 25 years for stealing televisions; Jerry 
Dewayne Williams, 25 years for stealing a slice of pizza.  
A few cases appeared in national news within the past six years include: John Horner was 
sentenced to 25 years for selling pain pills to help pay for his wife’s medical expenses; Hope 
Sykes was sentenced to 15 to 25 years because she helped her boyfriend sell drugs. The list of 
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people sentenced to life for petty offenses is endless. The point is that these laws took away the 
discretion of judges and mandate excessively long minimum sentences for the most petty of 
offenses. A more recent example of the application of mandatory sentencing laws is the case of 
Marissa Alexander, who was sentenced to 20 years for firing a warning short when she was 
assailed by her husband. However, in October 2014 the appeals court remanded the case back to 
the lower court on grounds that the judge erred in his instructions to the jury.  
Michelle Alexander, Mar Mauers and others of provided substantial documentation on 
racial biases in drug enforcement.  In Race to Incarcerate, Mauers reports that about .6 percent of 
the black population uses crack cocaine, compared to .2 percent of the white population. 
However, because whites constitutes a significant majority of the population, they constitute 54 
percent of the crack. Nevertheless, 81.4 percent of those arrested for crack cocaine related 
offenses are black. Alexander challenges the conventional wisdom that blacks are more likely to 
be arrested because they are more visible, as dealers sell crack on street corners in full public 
view. Alexander demonstrates that white dealers sell drugs in public view in predominantly 
white areas. However, police target black areas because of the public perception or prejudice that 
drug dealing is more common in black neighborhoods. Alexander and Mauers conclude that the 
higher black drug arrests, convictions and sentencing are functions of a racially biased criminal 
justice system.  
Mauers, Alexander and others demonstrate the extent of this racial bias with date from 
select states. Mauers notes that from 1988 to 1995 in seventeen states there was not one white 
suspect prosecuted under federal crack cocaine laws. Alexander noted that Georgia has a two-
strikes you’re out law that mandates life imprisonment for the second drug offense. Under this 
law 98 percent of those sentenced to life have been black drug offenders (Alexander).  
These racial biases spill over into the area of felon disenfranchisement. Felon 
disenfranchisement laws have disparate racial and class impacts. However, before examining 
these impacts we need to go back and review the various forms of felon disenfranchisement 
laws.  
 
Typology of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws 
 
 As noted above there is a range of disenfranchisement laws from no disenfranchisement 
to permanent disenfranchisement. Manza and Uggen’s provides the typology above. We add 
three additional levels to develop the following typology, with seven categories: 1. no 
Disenfranchisement, 2. only while incarcerated, 3. only while incarcerated and on parole, 4. only 
after completion of full sentence (payment of fine, completion of parole and probation), 5. after 
completion of sentence, but after a designated time period, 6. permanent disenfranchisement for 
select felonies, and 7. Permanent disenfranchisement. Only one state has no disenfranchisement 
law and that is Vermont. This state allows citizens to vote even while incarcerated. This was 
Ethan Allen’s state, the mountain man and American Revolutionary leader who was the most 
passionate about democracy. States that disenfranchise citizens only while they are incarcerated 
automatically restores the right to vote once they are released from prison. These states include: 
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah. Maine used to allow incarcerated 
citizens to vote. It recently disenfranchised the incarcerated.   Table 4 below includes four 
categories of the more restrictive disenfranchisement laws.  
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 All four categories include states that disenfranchise people while in prison. Category I 
includes the least restrictive states, those that disenfranchise felons after they are release and 
while they are on probation. Category II includes states that disenfranchise felons throughout the 
duration of their sentence. Voting rights are restored after completion of parole and probation.   
 
Table 4:  Typology of Post-Prison Release Disenfranchisement 
Categories 
I   II    III   IV 
                                                                                                    2-5 year wait or  
disenf only while incar, disenf for length of  permanent disenfran. Permanant 
or on probation,   sentence  (prob. Parole, fines) for select crimes  Disenfranchisement 
California  Alaska    Alabama  Florida    
Colorado  Arkansas   Arizona   Iowa 
Connecticut  Georgia    Delaware  Kentucky 
New York  Idaho    Mississippi   
   Kansas    Nebraska (2 yr w) 
   Louisiana   Nevada 
   Maryland   Tennessee 
   Minnesota   Virginia (2yr w for nonvio) 
   Missouri   Wyoming 
   New Jersey    Virginia 
New Mexico  
North Carolina  
Oklahoma  






A number of these states, most notably Arkansas, require felons to pay off all legal 
responsibilities associated with their conviction, including fines and other legal fees. These 
financial costs makes the restoration of the right to vote more onerous.    
 Category III and IV include the most onerous felon disenfranchisement laws. These laws 
clearly distinguish the United States from other developed democratic nations. These laws are 
exceptional in terms of the percentage of voting aged populations that are disenfranchised. 
Category III includes some states that have a waiting period before voting rights can be restored, 
states that permanently disenfranchised for select offenses, and states that have both. For 
example, in Arizona, people convicted of one felony can have their voting rights restored upon 
completion of their entire sentence: parole, probation and payment of all fines and fees. 
However, people convicted of two or more felonies are permanently disenfranchised, unless they 
receive a full pardon, which is not likely.  
 Many of these states including Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi, Nevada and Tennessee 
permanently disenfranchise ex-felons for only a few select offenses, unless they are pardoned by 
the judge of governor. In Alabama, most felons can have their voting rights restored after the 
completion of their sentence, which includes parole, probation and all fines. However, some 
repeat and serious offenders can be permanently disenfranchised. Mississippi has a list of ten 
felony and misdemeanor offenses that require permanent disenfranchisement. Nevada laws 
automatically restores the right to vote to first time felons upon the completion of their terms. 
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People with multiple felonies are permanently disenfranchised. Tennessee has recently to exempt 
certain felons from disenfranchisement while permanently disenfranchising others.   
Some states have recently reformed their laws, making it easier for felons to regain the 
right to vote. For example, prior to 2005 Nebraska permanently disenfranchise felons. After the 
passage of reform laws, a felon can have his right to vote restored two years after the completion 
of his sentence. Virginia recently replaced it permanent disenfranchisement law for a law that 
requires a five year waiting period for select violent or drug offenses.  Other felons can 
automatically have their rights restored.    
Some states have been involved with political struggles over the rights of ex-felons to 
vote. In 2005, the Governor of Iowa, Vilsack, issued an executive order restoring the right to 
vote to felons who had completed their entire sentence (parole, probation and payment of fines 
and fees). In 2011, Governor Branstad rescinded this order, making Iowa a category IV state that 
permanently disenfranchised felons.  
The Sentencing Project provided an update recent changes in state felon  
disenfranchisement laws. They are summarized below. As the Sentencing Project’s summary of 
changes indicates, over the past ten years a number of states have made progress in liberalizing 
their voting regulations for ex-felons.  
 
           
State  Change    (date of change   . 
Alabama  Streamlined restoration for most persons upon completion sentence (2003). 
Connecticut Restored voting rights to persons on probation (2001); repealed requirement to present proof of restoration in 
order to register (2006). 
Delaware Repealed lifetime disenfranchisement, replaced with five year waiting period for persons convicted of most 
offenses (2000). Repealed five-year waiting period for most offenses (2013).  
Florida Simplified clemency process (2004, 2007); adopted requirement for county fail officials to assist with 
restoration (2006); reversed modifications in clemency process (2011). 
Hawaii Codified data sharing procedures for removal and restoration process (2006).  
Iowa  Eliminated (2005) and reinstated (2011) lifetime disenfranchisement; simplified application process (2012) 
Kentucky Simplified restoration process ((2001, 2008), restricted restoration process (2004, amended in 2008) 
Louisiana Required Department of Public Safety and Corrections to provide notification of rights restoration process 
(2008) 
Maryland Repealed lifetime disenfranchisement (2007) 
Nebraska Repealed lifetime disenfranchisement, replaced with two-year waiting period (2005) 
New Jersey Established procedures requiring state criminal justice agencies to notify persons of their voting rights when 
released (2010) 
New Mexico Repealed lifetime disenfranchisement (2001), codified data sharing procedures, certificate of completion 
provided after sentence (2005) 
New York Required criminal justice agencies to provide voting rights information to persons who are again eligible to 
vote after a felony conviction (2010) 
North Carolina Required state agencies to establish a process whereby individuals will be notified of thir rights (2007) 
Rhode Island Restored voting rights to persons on probation and parole (2006) 
South Dakota Established new procedures to provide training and develop voter education curriculum to protect the voting 
rights of citizens with certain felony convictions (2010); revoked voting rights for persons on felony 
probation (2012)  
Tennessee Streamlined restoration process for most persons upon completion of sentence (2006) 
Texas Repealed two-year waiting period to restore rights (1997) 
Utah Clarified sate law pertaining to federal and out-of-state convictions (2006) 
Virginia Required notification of rights (2006); decreased waiting period for non-violent offenses from three years to 
two and established a 60 day deadline to process voting rights restoration applications (2010) eliminated 
waiting period and application for non-violent offenses (2013) 
Washington Restored voting rights for persons who exit the criminal justice system but still have outstanding financial 
obligations (2009) 





Florida has been on and off the list of states that permanently bar ex-felons from voting. 
In 2007, Florida’s Clemency Board, chaired by former governor Crist, passed a resolution to 
restore the right to vote to non-violent felons. In 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott, chaired the 
board and reversed the 2007 decision. Today, there is a path to restoring voting rights, but it is 
not open to all ex-felons. Florida ex-felons must wait for five years before they can apply to have 
their voting rights restored. If they are arrested within the five years, the clock starts over, 
whether they are innocent or not. After applying for restoration of this right, they would have to 
wait before the board acts. This wait can take up to seven years. Although technically ex-felons 
are not permanently disenfranchised in Florida, the difficulties of having these rights restored can 
be insurmountable. Because of these difficulties, Florida falls into category IV--states for all 
intents and purposes that permanently disenfranchise a large percentage of ex-felons.  
 
 
Impacts   
 
 The Sentencing Project estimates that about 6 million people are disenfranchised as a 
result of these laws. About three million ex-felons are disenfranchised. The percentage of the 
voting aged population disenfranchised because of these laws vary from state to state and are 




Top Ten Disenfranchising States 
   % of voting aged  % of voting age 
State   population disenfran.  Black pop. Disenf.  
Alabama  7.2    15.3 
Arizona  4.2    11.2 
Florida            10.4    23.3 
Georgia  3.8      7.5  
Kentucky  7.4    22.3 
Mississippi  8.3    13.9 
Nevada  4.2    12.6 
Tennessee  7.1    18.9 
Virginia  7.3    20.4 
Wyoming  6.0    18.3 
 In an age of polarized partisan politics and closely contested elections, decided by slim 
margins of a couple of percentage point, disenfranchising more than two percent of the 
population could have a deciding impact on the election. This impact is magnified when those 
who are disenfranchised favor one party over the other. Since blacks tend to vote Democrat, 
more than 80 percent in the past two decades, disenfranchising a significant proportion of blacks 
bias elections in favor of Republican candidates.   
 A number of studies have indicated that this is precisely the results of partisan 






 Constitutional law theorists are divided over the issue of the constitutionality of felon 
disenfranchisement laws. Defenders of these laws have the upper hand, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court supports them.  
 Defenders maintain that the constitutionality of these laws is well established. They use 
the constitution and case law to make their point. They argue that the original constitution 
delegated the authority to determine the qualifications for voting to the states and that the 
fourteenth amendment specifically allows for felon disenfranchisement laws. Section 2 of the 
fourteenth amendment reads: 
 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective number…But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors 
for President and Vice president of the United States, Representatives in Congress…is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state being twenty-one years of age, and a 
citizen of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime... 
 
Defenders insist that the phrase, “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,” allows 
states to deny the right to vote to citizens who had participated in a crime.  Moreover, they point 
to the Richardson v Ramirez decision. Citing the Ramirez decision, George Brooks summarizes 
the argument: 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing the plain language of Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and its historical and judicial interpretation. The Court held that 
the framers of the Amendment intended to exclude felons from the franchise. After an 
initial draft was rejected by the Senate, the language, “except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime,” was not changed despite several debates and proposed 
revisions. More specifically, although it granted that the legislative history bearing the 
words “or other crime’ was scant, the Court found it consistent with the clear wording of 
the section. Senator Henderson of Missouri felt that Section Two was an improvement on 
the earlier draft because disenfranchisement would follow for black and white alike. 
Likewise, Senator Drake of Missouri had introduced the modifying phrase “under laws 
equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State’ to the Act readmitting Arkansas so 
that felon disenfranchisement laws would not be used to disenfranchise blacks. (Brooks 
2004, 111).  
 
 In Richardson v Ramirez a number of ex-felons who had been released from prison and 
completed their parole in the state of California sued because California law had denied them the 
right to vote. They argued that their right to vote was protected by the constitution and that 
absent a compelling state interest, the state of California could not violate that right. Moreover, 
because the California law has a disparate impact on minority voters, it violated both the 14th and 
15th amendment.  
 Writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled in favor of the state of 
California and upheld felon disenfranchisement laws. He argued that the 14th amendment phrase 
“except for participation in rebellion, or other crime” provided “an affirmative sanction” for 
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felon disenfranchisement laws. This sanction exempts these laws from strict scrutiny, unless they 
were enacted with the explicit and expressed intention of denying blacks the right to vote.     
Rehnquist demonstrated that felon disenfranchisement laws not only predated the 14th 
amendment, they existed at the time the amendment was proposed and continued to exist after it 
was ratified.  
 Defenders point out that the only time the Court disallowed a felon disenfranchisement 
law was in the Hunter v Underwood (1985) decision. In this decision, the Alabama law that 
disenfranchised felons convicted for moral turpitude offenses was struck down because this law 
was passed with the expressed and explicit intention to disenfranchise blacks.  
 Opponents of felon disenfranchisement laws offer four counter arguments: proof of intent 
is too high a standard, Rehnquist erred in his reading of the 14th amendment and the intent of its 
authors; the 15th amendment superseded the 14th amendment; and the Voting Rights Act of 2006 
allows disparate impact challenges. 
First, opponents argue that the requirement of proof of discriminatory intent or purpose is 
too high a standard. All that is required for racial discrimination to occur is for policy makers to 
simply not state their purpose. This problem has been illustrated in the literacy test and poll tax 
cases. Literacy tests and poll taxes had been used effectively to disenfranchise blacks. Civil 
rights groups had been unable to prevail in these cases because policy makers had been clever 
enough not to state that these laws were enacted for the specific purpose of denying blacks the 
right to vote.  
The problem with requiring the showing of “discriminatory intent” rather than only 
showing “discriminatory effect” in equal protection cases, is further illustrated in a  non-voting 
rights case; United States v. Armstrong (517 U.S. 456).  In this case, it was demonstrated that in 
1991, every person prosecuted in California’s Central District Court, for distribution of crack 
cocaine, under two federal laws, was black.  Rehnquist, once again writing for the majority, 
restates equal protection standards; specifically,  “The claimant must demonstrate that the federal 
prosecutorial policy ‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose’ (emphasis added)” (465).  In his dissent, Justice Steven’s notes that although 65% of 
persons who used crack were white, they represented 4% of those convicted under federal law 
(479). The majority did not feel that this was sufficient to demonstrate a violation of 14th 
amendment equal protection.  The impact of this decision directly effects felon 
disenfranchisement.  In cases where persons convicted under federal law could be facing a life 
sentence, a similarly situated individual may serve as little as 5 years, taking into account time 
off for good behavior.  Hunter v. Underwood demonstrates the high standard necessary to show 
discriminatory intent. 
 Second, opponents of the Richardson decision disagree with Rehnquist’s interpretation of 
Section 2 of the 14th Amendment and of the intentions of the authors. For example, Jason 
Morgan-Foster argues that Rehnquist’s entire discussion of the actual wording, history and intent 
of the authors is incorrect.  He also challenges law journal articles defending Richardson v 
Ramirez: 
 
The article establishes that while the Ramirez Court believed that the words “or other 
crime’ emerged mysteriously from the black box of congressional committee, a review of 
the legislative history shows they were actually contemplated in open session before 
entering committee. This is significant, because the whole text of the plenary discussions 
has been preserved, whereas the Committee discussions have not. Examining these 
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plenary discussions, it is clear that the words “or other crime,” when taken in their proper 
context, were meant to refer to crimes of rebellion and disloyalty, particularly treason. By 
this understanding of the phrase, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment only 
affirmatively sanctions the disenfranchisement of those committing crimes of rebellion or 
disloyalty to the State, such as treason. With this textual bar removed with respect to 
most crimes, felon disenfranchisement can thus be examined through means-end 
constitutional scrutiny, as has become the practice for other first-generation voting rights 
issues Morgan-Foster 2006, 285).  
 
Morgan-Forster argues that the Republicans in Congress that introduced the 14th Amendment has 
already disenfranchised leaders of the Confederacy for their rebellion and treason, for attempting 
to destroy the union and initiating the Civil War which costs hundreds of thousands of lives. 
Moreover this same congress concerns that Southern states would use felony laws to 
disenfranchise blacks. He concludes that the correct reading to the Congressional debates Section 
2 is that these members of Congress intended to disenfranchise Confederate leaders for their 
participation in rebellion and other crime and that they also intended to prevent these same 
Confederate leaders from using criminal laws to disenfranchise blacks.  
 Third, opponents claim that the 15th Amendment superseded Section 2 of the 14th 
Amendment. For example, Gabriel Chin argues that these Confederate leaders did precisely what 
Congressional leaders feared: they engaged in a campaign to disenfranchise newly freed slaves. 
They used direct violence and law. This assault on black voting rights was so fierce and 
pervasive that Congress added another amendment, the 15th amendment. Chin maintains that the 
15th Amendment repealed Section 2 of the 14th Amendment. He bases this position on the fact 
that Section 2 recognized the authority of the state over the right to vote. It only penalized states 
for discriminating against blacks. Unlike the 14th Amendment, the 15th Amendment directly bars 
state governments from discriminating on the basis of race. Moreover, it explicitly expands 
federal powers to supersede state powers in order to prevent racial discrimination in voting. 
Indeed, Section 2 of the 15th Amendment states, “The Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.” 
 Fourth, opponents of felon disenfranchisement laws argue that the Voting Rights Act of 
1982 and 2006 allows for challenges to these laws on the basis of their impacts. The Voting 
Rights Act of 1982 was enacted in response to the Mobile v Bolden (1980) decision. In this case, 
the Court ruled that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not guarantee the election of blacks and 
that disparate impacts was not a valid basis to challenge the legality of voting laws. Rather, 
plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the law was enacted with a deliberate and explicit racially 
discriminatory intent. In response to this decision Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 
1982, which required courts to look at the totality of the circumstances when plaintiffs present 
evidence of racially discriminatory impacts. The totality of circumstances include not just the 
discriminatory impacts, but evidence of racial polarization in voting and racially charged 
elections. Lower courts have been divided over whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
allowed for a challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances. In Farrakhan v Washington (2003), the Ninth Circuit Court stated, “when felon 
disenfranchisement results in denial of the right to vote or vote dilution on account of race or 
color, Section 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] affords disenfranchised felons the means to seek 
redress.” However, other federal appeal courts have claimed that applying the Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act would unconstitutionally alter the balance of power between the states and the 
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federal government, as the Constitution gives the states the power to determine voting 
qualification on any basis other than race, gender or age.  
 Despite the debate between proponents and opponents, as of today, felon 
disenfranchisement laws have survived and will continue to survive constitutional challenge. 
Moreover, given the current make-up of the U.S. Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the Voting 




 Political theorists are divided over felon disenfranchisement laws. Proponents of these 
laws insist that they are well grounded in modern liberal democratic theory. These theorists find 
strong support in enlightenment and social contract philosophers. For example, commenting on 
early U.S. felon disenfranchisement laws, George Brooks says, “These early laws rested on John 
Locke’s concept that those who break the social contract should not be allowed to participate in 
the process of making society’s rule (Brooks 2004, 104).” Locke argued further that the law of 
nature was threatened by corrupt and degenerate men. Charles Montesquieu argued for the 
removal of criminals from society to protect the liberty of individuals. Jean Jacques Rousseau 
stated that “every offender who attacks the social right becomes through his crimes a rebel and a 
traitor to his homeland; he ceases to be one of its members by violating its laws, and he even 
wages war against it (Rousseau 1978, 65).” 
 Whereas we are hard pressed to find the one political theorist that challenged felon 
disenfranchisement laws, several theorists provide the basis for a critique. These theorists have 
contributed to the critical race or radical post-modern literature. They include Derrick Bell, 
Michelle Alexander, Leon Higgenbotham, David Theo Goldberg, Jurgen Habermas and others.  
This literature demonstrates that enlightenment and social contract theorists were infected 
by gender and racial prejudices common to their times.  These prejudices distorted and corrupted 
their ideas about the dignity and freedom of the individual by defining people who were not 
Western European men in oppositional terms. Men were rational and women were emotional. 
White Europeans were civilized and moral, black Africans were savage and immoral. These 
prejudices retarded the development of ideas of diverse democratic communities, of universal 
suffrage, and of bilateral communications between the state and diverse political communities.  
Rousseau’s views of the overly emotional women, unfit for higher education were 
expressed in his book, Emile. His notions of the noble savage were popularized in his book, 
Social Contract.  
The racial prejudices of theorists such as John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Immanuel Kant 
and others are more subtle, but evident in the contradictions of their writings. For example, in his 
First Treatise on Government, Locke rejects slavery and insists that all men are equal and entitle 
to natural rights that are ascertainable through reason. In the Second Treatise he insists that 
slavery is justifiable through just wars. David Goldberg adds this observation of Locke’s 
personal life: 
 
As secretary to the Carolina Proprietors (South Carolina), Locke played a key role in 
drafting both that colony’s Fundamental Constitution of 1669 and the Instructions to 
Governor Nicholson of Virginia. The former considered citizens ‘to have absolute power 
over [their] negro slaves’, and the latter considered the enslavement of negroes justifiable 
because prisoners of a just war who had ‘forfeited [their] own Life…by some Act that 
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deserves Death’. Locke considered the slave expeditions of the Royal Africa Company to 
be just wars in which the ‘negroes’ captured had forfeited their claim to life. 
 Locke committed no inconsistency here. Moreover, his view on this point actually 
reflected widely held European presuppositions about the nature of racial others, and by 
extension about human subjectivity. First, it is a basic implication of Locke’s account that 
anyone behaving irrationally is to that degree a brute and should be treated as an animal 
or machine. Hence, rationality is a mark of human subjectivity and so a condition of the 
necessity to be extended full moral treatment (Goldberg 1994, 27). 
 
Similar prejudices are found in the writings of Immanuel Kant. For example, Goldberg 
quoted Kant saying, “So fundamental is the difference between [the Negro and White] races of 
man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color (Kant 1960, 111 
quoted in Goldberg 1994, 32).” 
In his early years when he advocated the gradual end to slavery, Thomas Jefferson was 
committed to the ideas of the equality of all men. However, as he became more supportive of the 
institution of slavery in his later life, Jefferson came to believe that blacks were intellectually 
inferior to whites. He expressed these prejudices clearly in his book, Notes on Virginia.  
Whereas modern enlightenment theorists saw men as rational and moral, they saw 
Africans, Native Americans and women as fundamentally and essentially different. They saw 
blacks and Native Americans as savage and irrational and women as overly emotional, needing 
protection and ill-suited for politics. These prejudiced perceptions of women and racial 
minorities obstructed the growth and maturation of modern democratic theory, especially 
democratic theories that embraced diversity. Indeed, these prejudices have historically been 
powerful obstacle to the development of support for universal suffrage and the belief of the vote 






 The 21st century has inaugurated an era of democracy among developed nations. Today, 
most developed democratic countries sees the vote as a right of citizenship. Many see it as an 
obligation and responsibility of citizenship. Almost half of European nations allow incarcerated 
felons to vote. Not one bars ex-felons from voting. In 2005, the European Court of Human 
Rights declared that voting was a basic human right and that counties that banned felons from 
voting violated this right. South Africa’s Supreme Court recently struck down its laws that 
banned felons from voting.  
Whereas it boasts about its commitment to democracy and voting, whereas it claims that 
racial prejudice is a problem of the past, the United States of America stands alone in the world 
as an outlier nation. It has the highest incarceration rate in the world. It incarcerates a larger 
percentage of its minority population than any other nation in the world. It continues to 
disenfranchise a significant proportion of its minority population.  
Two factors have explained America’s contradictions and its penchant to disenfranchise a 
large proportion of is minority population: the persistence of racial fears and the partisan 
advantage of denying blacks the right to vote. As this review demonstrates, felon 
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disenfranchisement laws correlate strongly with racial fears. No doubt these fears correlate 
strongly with draconian criminal justice laws.  
The disenfranchisement of blacks today as it did in the post-Reconstruction era, 
advantages one party over the other. Today, with blacks voting for candidates of the Democratic 
Party in record numbers, disenfranchising blacks in record numbers clearly advantages both the 
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